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 When I go to the rural areas and ask people about 1325, they say, what is that? Is that a taxi 
number? Even educated people don’t know about 1325. How can we expect people in the 
village to know all these numbers and remember them? They don’t know what the Security 
Council is and what UNSCR 1325 is. They may memorize it for once but they forget after 
the programme is finished because the Security Council doesn’t sound “real” to them.1
The United Nations Security Council adopted 
its first Resolution on Women, Peace and 
Security (WPS), UNSCR 1325, in 2000.2 
Resolution 1325 focuses on four priority 
areas (also known as pillars) including 
participation, prevention, protection, and 
relief and recovery3, and “calls for the 
prosecution of crimes against women, 
increased protection of women and girls 
during war, the appointment of more 
women to UN peacekeeping operations and 
field missions and an increase in women’s 
participation in decision-making processes 
at the regional, national and international 
level”.4 This was the first thematic resolution 
on WPS, which is significant in many ways.5 
In particular, for the first time in history, the 
security of women in conflict was discussed 
in the Security Council.6 Resolution 1325 was 
also significant because it was an outcome of 
exceptional transnational collaboration among 
the women’s rights advocates from around 
the world, “inside and outside the UN”.7 For 
the first time, the door of the Security Council 
was open to accommodate the security needs 
of the ‘real people’, outside of the ‘old war’ 
discourse.8 Therefore, UNSCR 1325 was a 
watershed moment, which has provided 
mechanisms to incorporate gender into 
international peace and security legislation9 
and is “accepted as the founding document 
of the WPS agenda”.10 
It has been 16 years since the passage of 
Resolution 1325. The Security Council has 
adopted 7 other resolutions since then.11 
Various mechanisms have been adopted 
to operationalise the WPS agenda into the 
local context, such as incorporating the WPS 
agenda into the existing programmes and 
policies and/or developing a National Action 
Plan (NAP).12 However, the NAP has been 
the most common way of implementing the 
WPS agenda and can be seen as a formal 
ratification of the WPS resolutions by the 
state.13 Despite its relevance to all countries, 
only 63 countries have developed their NAPs 
on Resolution 1325 as of January 2017, the 
first being Denmark and the most recent 
ones at the time of writing being Kenya, 
Ukraine, Timor-Leste and South Sudan.14 
Nepal adopted its NAP in 2011 to be the 
first country in South Asia.15 
Nepal’s NAP is seen as one of the best 
examples. It was developed through a highly 
consultative process with extraordinary levels 
of collaboration between government and 
non-governmental bodies. Nepal was also a 
focal point of the Global Study on 1325 16 
carried out by the UNWOMEN in 2015. Some 
of the recommendations of the Global Study 
on 1325 are derived from the experiences of 
the Nepal NAP. In this paper, I aim to examine 
the contrast between the supposed success 
of Nepal’s NAP and its minimal impact on 
the ground. I argue that, although the 
NAP was an excellent idea and it received a 
significant amount of attention, both from the 
government and development partners, and 
significant efforts were made to include the 
voices of locals, the achievements are very few 
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compared to the investment.17 Only a small 
number of people have benefitted from the 
NAP. Instead of helping to improve the lives 
of women impacted by the armed conflict, 
the NAP has reduced the scope of the whole 
Women, Peace and Security agenda to a few 
projects. The NAP became a development 
project, not a process for sustainable peace, for 
two fundamental reasons: a) problems at the 
discursive level, both knowledge construction 
at international level and understanding of 
the WPS framework at the local level; and b) 
reliance on experts’ knowledge and co-option 
of the WPS agenda by the development 
organisations and humanitarian agencies. 
This paper is based on my interviews with 
21 stakeholders in Nepal. I interviewed both 
donors and implementing agencies such as 
the government institutions, UN agencies, 
I/NGOs and civil society organisations, who 
were involved in the development as well as 
the implementation of the NAP. In addition, 
I interviewed actors who had nothing to 
do with the NAP, meaning they were never 
involved in any of the conversations about 
the NAP, even though they had been working 
with the conflict affected women in Nepal 
for several years.18 This paper is divided into 
three main sections. In the first section, I 
shed light on the development and the 
implementation of the NAP in Nepal. The 
second section examines the achievements 
since the NAP and the third section highlights 
some of the key challenges for the effective 
implementation of the NAP in Nepal. 
However, before proceeding, I briefly describe 
the war context. 
THE WAR CONTEXT
The Civil War in Nepal, known as the 
People’s War, started in 1996 and lasted for 
ten years.19 During the decade of war, over 
200,000 people were displaced, over 14,000 
people were killed and over 1,400 people 
disappeared.20 These are only estimated 
figures. The actual number of displacements, 
deaths and disappearances are likely to 
be much higher. Moreover, hundreds of 
thousands lost their livelihoods; young women 
became widows; schools and health posts 
were closed; women and girls were raped 
and sexually abused21; and people were forced 
to leave their homes.22 In addition to internal 
displacements, people also migrated to other 
countries. The forced migration that started 
during the war has now become a trend, so 
that most of the villages are left with only 
women, elderly people and children. 
It has been over a decade since the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
2006. However, people who were affected 
by the war are still waiting for justice. 
Thousands of people displaced by the conflict 
remain displaced.23 The wives and families 
of disappeared people are still waiting for 
justice.24 The survivors of rape and sexual 
violence have not received any support.25 
Likewise, women who were forced into 
prostitution during the war are not even 
seen as conflict victims. Further, attention 
to the conflict has waned, especially since 
the devastating earthquake in April–May 
2015, which took over 9000 lives and 
displaced millions of people. The priority of 
the government and donors has shifted from 
the conflict victims to the earthquake victims 
(a similar shift occurred in Aceh where post-
Tsunami recovery programmes marginalised 
the peace process).26 Even though there is 
still a lot to be done to support the women 
impacted by the People’s War, the government 
seems to feel that it has done enough 
and there is no need for a peacebuilding 
intervention in Nepal. 
NATIONAL ACTION PLANS 
As discussed earlier, NAPs have been the 
most common way of implementing the WPS 
agenda. The NAPs can be divided into two 
different categories: those that are developed 
by countries emerging from conflicts and 
those developed by states, which provide the 
development and humanitarian assistance 
to these conflict-affected countries.27 Laura 
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that provide development aid (such as the UK, 
Australia, USA and Germany), and “inward 
looking” – the NAPs developed by countries 
that are emerging from conflicts (such as the 
plans in Afghanistan and Pakistan).28 The 
NAPs have taken different forms with different 
priorities in different contexts.29 For instance, 
the third Norway NAP “concentrates largely 
on gender-responsive humanitarian action 
in Norway’s foreign security and aid policy 
toward fragile and conflict-affected states, 
and has a sizable budget commitment”30, 
whereas, “[i]n conflict-affected countries such 
as the Philippines (first country in Asia to 
adopt a NAP), the NAP covers the domestic 
implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty 
provisions through national laws to regulate 
small arms transfer and exchange, given their 
use in the perpetration of gender based and 
sexual violence. By contrast, in Georgia’s NAP 
the development of indicators for monitoring 
the protection of internally displaced women 
and girls is prioritised among the actions”.31 
Some studies have been carried out to gauge 
the effectiveness of the NAPs. The Global Study 
2015 on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 
suggests that there has been some progress 
regarding the protection of women’s rights in 
war.32 For instance, the Secretary-General has 
appointed a Special Representative to report 
on the cases of Sexual Violence in Conflict 
following UNSCR 1888. Likewise, the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
which came into effect in 2002, has outlined a 
comprehensive list of crimes against women as 
war crimes and crimes against humanity within 
the jurisprudence of the ICC, the CEDAW 
Committee adopted General Recommendation 
30 on women in conflict prevention and post 
conflict situations, along with a slight increase 
in women’s representation in peacekeeping 
missions can all be seen as progress. However, 
despite some progress, the resolutions on 
Women, Peace and Security mostly remain 
rhetoric. Even after 16 years, the impacts on the 
ground remain negligible. The Global Study also 
suggests that, although some countries have 
come up with a National Action Plan, they have 
no mechanism to ensure accountability, nor 
any budget available for the implementation.33 
The Nepalese NAP development process 
begun on 31 March 2010. Resolution 1325 
was adopted by the Council in 2000, when 
Nepal was in the middle of the Civil War, 
and the majority of people did not know 
about the Resolution until 2007. Some 
organisations claimed they had been working 
on Resolution 1325 since 2003. However, 
the awareness about the Resolution was 
limited to a few NGOs and UN agencies. 
Lesley Abdela, who has documented the 
implementation of Resolution 1325 in Nepal 
since its adoption to just before the NAP, 
suggests that Resolution 1325 was used as an 
advocacy tool by some NGOs and UN agencies 
to increase women’s participation in peace 
processes and to campaign against gender-
based violence.34 However, it is important to 
note that despite their advocacy, no women 
were included in the peace negotiations and 
there is no reference to Resolution 1325 in the 
CPA. The CPA has only one point on women 
and children’s rights without a great detail.35 
Therefore, it is unclear if Resolution 1325 had 
any impact on the CPA. 
A new ministry, the Ministry of Peace and 
Reconstruction (MoPR), was established 
in 2007 with a peacebuilding mandate. 
Women’s rights activists, in collaboration with 
UNWOMEN, decided to approach the MoPR 
instead of going to the Ministry for Women, 
Children and Social Welfare (MoWCSW) 
because Resolution 1325 was not just a 
women’s agenda. It was a peacebuilding 
agenda and the MoPR was established with 
peacebuilding mandate. It was a strategic 
decision of the women’s rights activists. They 
thought it will be more effective if they are 
associated with the MoPR, where they will 
have access to wide range of stakeholders 
from various ministries, which supports Aisling 
Swaine’s argument about the location of NAP 
within the government being critical for the 
effectiveness and to determine its focus.36
Although the consultation had begun in 2007, 
the discussion regarding the implementation 
of Resolution 1325 only started after the 
formation of a High-Level Steering Committee 
(HLSC) in September 2009. The HLSC was 
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Temporary settlement of the people displaced by the devastating earthquake in April 2015
chaired by the then Deputy Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister and co-chaired by 
the Minister of Peace and Reconstruction, 
both of whom were men. The MoPR, in 
partnership with UN agencies, donors, and 
women’s rights organisations, initiated the 
discussion with other line ministries, security 
sectors and political institutions including 
Constituent Assembly (CA) members.37 A 
women’s rights activist, who has been actively 
involved in promoting women’s rights and 
gender equality in Nepal for over two decades, 
said, “[i]nitially, we didn’t know about the 
National Action Plan. It was only when 2010 
was approaching. As you know, UNSCR 1325 
marked the 10th anniversary in 2010, so there 
was a momentum and the discussion about 
the NAP was coming up”.38 The Nepal’s NAP 
was what Jacqui True calls a “period effect”, 
which suggests that “member states perceived 
the importance of WPS issues in light of the 
global meeting reviewing progress made over 
a decade in implementing 1325”.39 
A series of meetings and consultations were 
held, both at the national level as well as local 
levels. To ensure that the needs and concerns 
of locals were incorporated in the NAP and 
also to ensure local ownership, district-level 
consultation workshops were carried out in 52 
districts between July and September 2010. 
Special consultations were also held with 
women and girls directly affected by conflict 
to ensure their concerns were reflected in the 
NAP.40 After 10 months of rigorous process, 
the Nepal NAP was finalised and adopted on 
1 February 2011. There was a rush towards 
the end because Nepal wanted to become 
the first South Asian country to have NAP. A 
group of people flew to New York to launch 
the National Action Plan on 23 February 2011 
during the 55th session of the Commission 
on the Status of Women.41 
The development of the NAP was highly 
consultative and is often cited as one of the 
best examples of a collaborative project. 
Compared to other National Action Plans, 
such as the National Plan of Action on the 
Implementation of the CEDAW, 2004, and the 
National Plan of Action on Gender Equality 
and Empowerment of Women, 2005, the 
Action Plan on 1325 and 1820 received far 
more attention from the government, donors 
and civil society organisations. 
The collaboration between the government 
and the development partners continued 
even after the launch of the NAP. For 
the implementation of the NAP, a High-
Level Steering Committee and the NAP 
implementing committees were formed with 
the representation from various ministries, civil 
society organisations and the UNWOMEN. 
In addition, a gender unit was established 
at the MoPR, and for the localisation of the 
NAP, NAP District Coordination Committees 
(DCCs) were formed in each district.42 
The Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) allocated 
NPR 844.5 million (around US$7.9 million) 
to fund ten NAP projects from ten different 
ministries.43 Most of the budget (61 per cent of 
the $7.9 million) was allocated to the Ministry 
of Home Affairs to spend in the defence sector, 
training police personnel on UNSCR 1325 and 
developing infrastructures. The remainder 
was given to other ministries: 10 per cent to 
the Ministry of Education, 7 per cent to the 
Department of Cottage and Small Industry, 
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7 per cent to MoWCSW and less than 5 per 
cent was allocated to the National Women’s 
Commission and other ministries.44 In addition, 
the development partners provided technical 
support as well as funded some additional 
NAP projects. 
Although it may look like a lot has been 
done, most of these projects were short-term, 
only made to last up to two to three years 
and implemented in only a few districts. 
The project funds were spent mostly on 
the training and capacity building of staff 
and stakeholders from national to district 
levels. Likewise, some money was spent on 
awareness-raising on UNSCRs 1325 and 1820, 
and the development of training manuals. 
Most of the NAP projects have now finished. 
The first NAP has been phased out and the 
process of developing the second phase of 
the NAP has started and is making very slow 
progress. Although the decision has been 
made by the government to go ahead with 
the second NAP, there is a lot of uncertainty 
about the process and the funding. The 
government of Nepal never allocated any 
budget for the NAP implementation, and 
development partners are reluctant to invest 
for various reasons such as funding cuts, 
shifting priorities and pressure to produce 
tangible outputs, which I will discuss later 
in this paper. 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
The very fact that the NAP’s launch was held in 
New York shows just how enthusiastic Nepal 
was for this process. Although it is difficult 
to separate the achievements of the NAP 
because gender mainstreaming was already 
strong in the Nepalese development discourse 
prior to the NAP and there were several 
projects to support conflict-affected women 
as a part of post-conflict reconstruction and 
peacebuilding programmes, it can be said 
that the NAP has strengthened the gender 
mainstreaming discourse, especially in the 
government institutions. Moreover, the 
NAP has also been used as an advocacy tool 
to create awareness about the gendered 
impacts of war. In this section, I analyse some 
of the achievements since the NAP under its 
four pillars. 
One of the achievements of the NAP is 
women’s increased participation in the UN 
Peacekeeping Missions. An army officer, who 
is the Training Officer and Gender Focal Point 
of NEPBATT (Nepalese Battalion) for the UN 
Peacekeeping Mission, said, “UNSCR 1325 
certainly has influenced the UN Peacekeeping 
mission. There has to be minimum 5-10 
per cent women’s participation in the 
Peacekeeping Mission from Nepal”.45 The 
Nepalese Army also sends Military Observers 
in the Peacekeeping Missions, with minimum 
3 per cent women in these roles under a 
new Army policy.46 Participation of women, 
however, is still far below the constitutionally 
guaranteed 33 per cent.  
Some progress can also be seen in other 
sectors, for example the Election Commission 
issued a Gender and Inclusion Policy in 2013, 
which ensures gender mainstreaming in all 
electoral processes to increase women’s 
participation in politics. The Ministry of Local 
Development and Federal Affairs (MOLDFA) 
made a provision to allocate 10 per cent of their 
grant to promote women’s empowerment 
and to increase their participation. Likewise, 
Local Peace Committee has to have 33 per 
cent women’s representation. 
There are of course various factors that 
contributed to increasing women’s 
participation. The work on improving women’s 
participation in decision-making had begun 
in early 2000. The significant presence of 
women in the Maoist movement, combined 
with the work of women’s rights organisations 
as well as development agencies, contributed 
to put pressure on the government to increase 
women’s participation. 
Turning to the “protection” pillar, one of 
the main achievements since the NAP was 
the development of the Gender Policy 2012 
by the Nepal Police, which emphasises the 
special needs of women. The Nepal Police 
has also issued a Code of Conduct Against 
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Gender Based Violence and the Nepal Army 
has developed several training manuals on 
gender. The training curriculum for the new 
recruits includes a session on UNSCRs 1325 
and 1820. According to the NPTF, 1997 
army personnel – 479 females and 1518 
males – received training on UNSCRs 1325 
and 1820 until the end of March 2016.47 
Likewise, a separate accommodation was built 
for women in the Panchkhal Barracks so that 
when women go to Panchkhal for trainings, 
they can stay there, with two childcare centres 
built in two separate army barracks.48
By contrast, nothing has been done on 
violence prevention under the NAP in Nepal. 
An NGO worker commented that “prevention 
means addressing the root causes, which 
means implementing long-term programmes, 
which cannot be done by the development 
partners or NGOs because they have limited 
budget, defined outputs and need to finish 
their project on time”.49 Similarly, little 
has been done on relief and recovery and 
whatever was done was part of a bigger post-
conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, 
such as some scholarships to the children of 
martyrs and some relief to conflict-affected 
families, but there was nothing on recovery. 
Although the NAP development process was 
almost led by the development agencies 
in terms of providing technical support as 
well as funding, the NAP became a policy 
document for government, which also meant 
that it was applicable only to government-
run programmes. The implementation 
of the NAP or the incorporation of the 
provisions of the NAP was not mandatory 
for the development partners including UN 
agencies, NGOs and donors. It was a choice 
for the development agencies and not the 
mandate and the implementation of the 
WPS agenda dependent on their “will”. 
Moreover, the impact of NAP can only be 
seen in those areas, sectors or institutions 
where they had NAP funded projects. 
This certainly does not mean that there 
was no progress made on gender in other 
institutions. The incremental progress to bring 
more women into decision-making levels 
can be seen in all sectors. However, it is part 
of the wider inclusion discourse rather than 
attributable to the impact of NAP. It sometimes 
gets blurry because the same person who 
advocated for the NAP may also influence, 
in other capacity, gender mainstreaming in 
different organisations. Moreover, women 
who are part of the decision-making body, 
even though they do not know about NAP, 
are advocating for the inclusion of more 
women. A Constituent Assembly member 
of the second CA, for example, said she 
did not know about the NAP or the UNSCR 
1325. However, she has been advocating for 
women’s participation in decision-making 
levels in parliament. Moreover, it is also 
difficult to distinguish the progress made 
because of the government’s intervention 
and the development partners because they 
are dependent on each other.50 Although 
United Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) came soon 
after the CPA, it did not do anything on the 
Resolution 1325 saying it was government’s 
responsibility and that the UN did not have 
much role to play.51 This gives some hints to 
the complexity of the context and illustrates 
the scope and the limitation of the NAP. 
CHALLENGES 
“UNSCR 1325 is seen as a women’s 
project”.52 The Global Study on 1325 
recommends essential elements for a good 
NAP and the Nepal NAP contained all of them: 
comprehensive goals, strategic objectives, 
specific actions, indicators, clear lines of 
responsibilities and timeframe.53 However, it 
still did not contribute to improving the lives 
of conflict-affected women in Nepal. The 
elaborated NAP development process and 
its limited implementation are an indication 
of a very low impact on the ground. Despite 
the strategic decision by women’s rights 
organisations to incorporate the WPS agenda 
into the MoPR’s mandate, NAP projects were 
still seen as women’s projects. Therefore, in 
spite of all the attention, the status of the 
NAP projects was not very different from any 
other projects on gender. 
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(2016): 337.
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One of the main reasons why the WPS 
agenda has not been very effective on 
the ground is the construction of the WPS 
discourse at international level, which affects 
the implementation at the local level. Laura 
Shepherd argues that the way 1325 is 
understood by the policymakers determines 
how it is going to be implemented.54 Katrina 
Lee-Koo expands on that, saying, “[t]he political 
context, discursive framework and a priori 
subjectivities of the reader play an important 
role in constructing an understanding of what 
UNSCR 1325 means, and how it should be 
taken forward”.55 Resolution 1325 was a 
new phenomenon in Nepal brought by the 
international community. Therefore, they had 
to rely on experts’ knowledge. The policy-
makers needed to be trained first and then 
train others. Hence, most of the NAP budget 
was spent on trainings and orientation. 
Although the government took the lead 
and the civil society was very active, the NAP 
development process in Nepal was funded by 
the international community and was framed 
within the international WPS discourse, which 
influenced the implementation. Despite other 
important needs of conflict survivors, most 
of the NAP funding was spent on supporting 
security sector. Moreover, the NAP was taken 
as a development project and therefore, its 
implementation was very much development 
oriented. It was a five-year plan with fixed 
budget and defined indicators. The reliance on 
experts’ knowledge and co-option of the WPS 
agenda by the development organisations 
was the main reason for the failure of the 
first NAP in Nepal. 
The changing context (ten years since the war) 
and shifting priorities also posed a challenge 
to the implementation of the NAP. Since the 
earthquake, the priority of the government as 
well as the development partners has shifted 
to humanitarian work. Although the most 
vulnerable people, who were once victims 
of conflict, have also been affected by the 
earthquake, there is no link between the 
WPS agenda and the post-disaster response. 
These seem to be two different projects, very 
distinct from each other. 
This is evident in the way that the 
government of Nepal has been asking all 
the donors/development partners to invest 
in reconstruction activities and discouraging 
them from spending on any peacebuilding 
activities. An officer from an International 
NGO said, “it is very difficult to work on 
peacebuilding in Nepal”.56 Some of the 
organisations whose main focus was 
peacebuilding said they cannot use the 
word “peacebuilding” as it is no longer 
seen as relevant in Nepal. Moreover, both 
the government and the donors are now 
focusing on the Sustainable Development 
Goals. The WPS agenda is no longer a priority 
for some development partners in Nepal. For 
instance, Nepal is no longer a priority country 
in the WPS agenda for the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID), which also 
means that they have no funding to support 
the second Nepal NAP. 
The global slashing of the foreign aid also 
had impact on Nepal. A senior officer from 
an International NGO said, “there is no 
dedicated fund for the WPS agenda. When 
there is a funding cut, soft issues like this (WPS 
agenda) suffer. We can’t cut funds from our 
ongoing projects … it is difficult to cut funding 
from infrastructure related projects”.57 The 
recent earthquake in 2015 also has taken 
the attention of the government and the 
development partners from the conflict-
affected people to the earthquake victims. 
Most of the organisations have redirected 
their support to the earthquake victims. 
On the one hand, the government is asking 
the donors to invest in hardware projects 
(reconstruction), and on the other hand, the 
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development partners have the pressure to 
show tangible outputs within a short project 
period. Therefore, they are more interested in 
investing in something where they can show 
the immediate results. A senior officer from 
a donor agency said, “the WPS is a long-
term plan and needs a long-term investment. 
Therefore, it should be the government’s 
responsibility”.58 Despite support from 
the international donors, the WPS agenda 
became the state’s responsibility59 and for 
the development partners, implementation 
of the NAP was a choice.
The management of funds also posed a 
challenge for the NAP implementation. A 
senior officer from the government said, “[t]
here was a lot of interest initially from the 
donors. The government received a lot of 
money for the implementation of the NAP but 
there was no proper management of the fund. 
The fund was distributed haphazardly … we 
couldn’t keep the track of the NAP projects. 
The same people received the same sorts of 
training from different organizations”.60 
He further added, “a lot of these problems 
would have been avoided by having an 
investment plan”. The projects were funded 
without proper planning and were never 
monitored. Although there was a monitoring 
guideline, not a single field visit was carried 
out. Therefore, the actors involved in the 
implementation did not feel accountable to 
anybody. Projects were taking longer to finish, 
and there was nothing to report on so many 
of the activities they had planned for the 
project.61 The officer from the government 
also mentioned that “[a]lthough there 
was a provision in the NAP to establish an 
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Information Centre to keep a record of all 
the NAP projects, implemented by both 
the government as well as the civil society 
organizations, it didn’t materialize. Therefore, 
there was a duplication of the programme and 
it became very difficult to keep the track of 
who was doing what”.62 
Another challenge he pointed out was that, 
“some people received skills training but did 
not receive any support for buying equipment 
or setting up a business. Therefore, the training 
was useless for them. The only benefit, for 
them, was coming to the district headquarters 
and staying in a hotel for two to three nights. 
Therefore, the same people finished one 
training and waited for another”.63 Almost 
a year was spent on designing and developing 
the NAP. However, there seemed to be a 
lack of planning for the implementation. This 
shows that the NAP was an outcome and an 
end goal in itself, lending further credence to 
the argument about projectisation. 
Moreover, the operating environment is often 
not understood as gendered. Therefore, it is 
important to look at the internal dynamics 
– who makes the decisions, who is more 
influential, what kind of issues get priority 
over others and so on. Any decisions that 
are made depend on various intersecting 
factors, such as the status, orientation, 
mood, capacity and capability of the leaders 
in power and their commitment to the matter. 
District Coordination Committees (DCCs) 
and Local Peace Committees (LPCs) were 
the implementing bodies at the local level in 
Nepal. The DCCs, which were chaired by the 
Chief District Officer (CDO), were mostly male 
dominated. Although there was a mandatory 
33 per cent women’s representation in LPCs, 
the LPC was a political body. The members of 
LPCs were mostly representatives from various 
political parties. Therefore, one can imagine 
the nature of representation and localisation. 
One of my research participants said, “the 
CDO is the chair of the DCC and he is often 
the chair of many other such committees. 
Therefore, he can’t even remember how many 
committees he is chairing unless there is a 
project running”.64 
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Although there was a good collaboration 
between the civil society and the government 
during the NAP development process, 
there was a lack of coordination during 
the implementation. Although the inter-
ministerial collaboration was appreciated 
during the NAP drafting process, there was 
a lack of coordination at the local level. For 
instance, if a programme implemented by 
the MoPR focused on women, it had to 
be approved by the Women Development 
Officer, which was challenging and time-
consuming so the coordination within the 
government institution was not easy.  
The NAP was a project of only those who 
were involved in the NAP development 
process. The organisations who were not 
involved in the development of the NAP 
or were not the implementing partners 
did not own the NAP. They criticised the 
approach taken by the whole NAP group. 
Although some of the policies had a wider 
impact, such as the mandatory 33 per 
cent representation of women in LPCs, the 
NAP projects were implemented only in 
some areas of selected districts. Therefore, 
the expectation for a wider change was 
just an imagination. Moreover, projects 
implemented by the development partners 
had their own target groups, which excluded 
women from the same community who 
would have needed the support more. 
Although there was a good inter-ministerial 
collaboration during the development of the 
NAP, none of these ministries allocated any 
budget for the implementation of the NAP, 
nor did they incorporate any of the NAP 
components into their programmes. When I 
asked the Ministry of Women, Children and 
Social Welfare about the implementation of 
the NAP, they said they only had one project 
on the NAP funded by the NPTF, which has 
finished so there is nothing to report.
Although the government owned the NAP, 
the fund for the implementation of the NAP 
was sought externally. The challenge at the 
moment is that the donors and NGOs are 
saying it is the government’s responsibility, 
but the government does not have the 
money to support the next phase of the 
NAP. The situation is quite complex. On 
the one hand, the government is keen and 
committed to developing the second NAP, 
on the other hand, the government does 
not have any money for the NAP. 
To ensure accountability, the NAP had a 
provision for yearly monitoring. However, 
a representative from the civil society said, 
“it was too ambitious. The money should 
have been allocated for the final evaluation 
instead”.65 Indeed the way yearly monitoring 
was designed was an expensive way of 
doing it. It should have been designed 
differently in a more cost effective way, such 
as the civil society could have prepared a 
yearly shadow monitoring report. Moreover, 
although there was money for monitoring, 
only two monitoring reports were prepared. 
And there was no money allocated for the 
final evaluation. The government does not 
want to proceed without the final evaluation 
and the development partners are not 
interested in funding any money on the 
NAP. Therefore, there is a deadlock kind of 
situation at the moment. 
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The NAP development process was 
remarkable, but the NAP ended up being an 
end goal in itself. The government’s reliance 
on the donors and the perception of donors 
that the implementation of the NAP is the 
government’s responsibility also has posed 
a challenge. The Programme Director of 
an International NGO said, “everyone has 
to take the responsibility of implementing 
the NAP. Not just the government. The NAP 
is not a separate project. We all need to 
incorporate the components of the NAP into 
our operations”. She also emphasised that, 
“the NAP is a process, not an end goal”.66 
All of my research participants said that 
UNSCR 1325 is a useful framework. However, 
people cannot relate to it. One of my research 
participants said, “the Security Council does 
not feel real to them. Even if you give them 
training, they will remember for a few days and 
then forget”.67 The Programme Coordinator 
of an International NGO said, “when I went 
into the field in the past, women knew what 
1325 was but now they all have forgotten”.68 
Therefore, the suggestion was that, instead 
of giving trainings on what the UN Security 
Council is and what 1325 is, it would be easier 
for people to relate to if we talk about the 
status of women in conflict and what needs 
to be done. 
Although the Nepal NAP was on the 
implementation of two resolutions – 
Resolutions 1325 and 1820 – the NAP 
was seen as a synonym for 1325. All the 
programmes implemented under the NAP 
focused on increasing participation and 
protection and nothing was done to support 
the survivors of sexual violence. Some of my 
research participants emphasised that there 
is silence, both from the government side as 
well as from women’s rights organisations, 
because the state actors – the Nepal Army and 
the Armed Police Force – committed most of 
the rape crimes. Another concern was about 
the complexity and time-consuming process 
of reporting incidences of sexual violence. If 
you bring a case of sexual violence, you need 
to provide long-term support to the victim, 
from providing justice to helping them rebuild 
their lives. There were no resources for that 
and no mechanisms in place. Therefore, there 
is a reluctance to bring this issue to light.
CONCLUSION
One of the interesting findings that seemed 
obvious during the interviews was that those 
who were involved in the NAP development 
process were positive about the NAP, whereas 
those who were not involved were very 
critical of the whole process and they had 
doubts about whether the NAP had made 
any difference. 
Compared to the other National Action 
Plans, the NAP on 1325 and 1820 received 
significant attention from the government as 
well as from the civil society organisations. It 
was developed through a very consultative 
process, involving stakeholders from the 
national level to the grassroots level. 
Although there were a lot of challenges to 
the implementation of the NAP, it has, to 
some extent, contributed to strengthening 
the gender mainstreaming discourse in Nepal. 
The participation of women has increased 
significantly in every sector, including in the 
security sector. The NAP has contributed 
to bringing about some gender-friendly 
policies and has created awareness among 
government officials and security personnel 
about the differential impacts of war on 
women. However, it has not made a lot of 
difference to the experiences of conflict-
affected women. There were various 
challenges to its implementation, such as lack 
of commitment, no accountability, shifting 
priorities and changing political contexts. 
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The biggest challenge was the projectised 
approach, which has reduced the whole WPS 
agenda to a couple of projects. Likewise, 
limited scope, political instability and a male-
dominated operational environment were 
some of the other challenges. Although the 
Nepal NAP on the implementation of UNSCRs 
1325 and 1820 was seen as one of the best 
NAPs, the implementation remained weak. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the NAP has 
set up the groundwork for future intervention. 
There is a High-Level Steering Committee to 
oversee all the implementation processes. 
There is an implementing committee, 1325 
Action Group and a Peace Support Working 
Group, who had been actively engaged in the 
implementation of the first NAP. Moreover, 
various guidelines have been developed for 
the effective implementation of the NAP, such 
as localisation guidelines in 2012, monitoring 
guidelines in 2012 and training manuals by 
various implementing agencies, including 
the Nepal Police and Nepal Army. However, 
this can be seen as a start, and there is a lot 
more to be done.
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